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COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE OF AN AUTOMOBILE GUEST-
APPORTIONMENT OF DAMAGES UNDER THE COMPARATIVE
NEGLIGENCE STATUTE
John M. Gradwohl*
The purpose of this article is twofold: first, to analyze and consider
those situations in which the contributory fault of an automobile guest
may present either a total or partial bar to his recovery for his dam-
ages and injuries; and second, to analyze and consider the methods
of apportionment of the guest's damages and injuries under Nebraska
law in situations where he has been guilty of some form of contribu-
tory negligence.
During the last few years, the Nebraska Supreme Court has care-
fully stated, explained, and clarified the written law of contributory
negligence applicable to the automobile guest. Yet, in an extremely
large percentage of these cases the Court has reversed the lower court's
decision when it came to an application of this law to the facts of the
particular case. The problem facing the trial judge or counsel has not
been one of knowing "how" to instruct, but, rather, one of "when"
to instruct, on the issue of contributory negligence. Thus, while the
current stated law seems clear, as a practical matter it is difficult to
delineate that type of conduct by an automobile guest which may
actually bar a recovery by him either in whole or in part.
The recent decision in Segebart v. Gregory' may be used to illus-
strate an interesting and important problem of apportionment, under
the comparative negligence statute, of the damages to an automobile
guest. Plaintiff was a guest in Sandoz's automobile which had been
parked on an abandoned highway on a rainy night. In starting up,
Sandoz drove onto the left-hand lane, and hit defendant's car which
was either parked or driving slowly without lights. The court noted
that "The primary cause of the collision of course was the driving of
the Sandoz automobile into that of the defendant." 2 But, nevertheless,
the plaintiff could recover the entire amount of his damage from de-
fendant on a joint tortfeasor theory, even though Sandoz's negligence
may have been the greater contributing cause in fact, and even though
under the motorist guest statute3 Sandoz might have had a complete
defense to any action by the plaintiff against him.
* Member of the Nebraska Bar.
1156 Neb. 261, 55 N.W.2d 678 (1952).
- Id. at 269, 55 N.W.2d at 683. .3 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-740 .(Reissue.1952): "The owner or operator of a
motor vehicle shall not be lIable for any damages to any passenger or person
riding in such motor vehicle as a guest;or by invitation and'noi for hire,
unless such damage is caused by the driv6r of such motor vehicle being under
the influence of intoxicating.liquor or because, of the gross negligehce of 'the
owner or operator in the 6peration of such motor vehicle."
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This holding is apparently a standard result in jurisdictions applying
the comman law rule that each joint tortfeasor is liable for the entire
indivisible damage suffered by a plaintiff4 even though the other tort-
feasor may have a complete defense to plaintiff's action.5 Thus one
who is a joint tortfeasor with an immune governmental unit6 or with
the spouse of an injured party in a jurisdiction where tort suits are
barred between spouses7 will be forced to pay the entire amount of
damage to the plaintiff.
But suppose that in Segebart v. Gregory the plaintiff had been
guilty of some type of conduct which would constitute contributory
negligence on his part. The common law rule that plaintiff's contribu-
tory negligence is a complete defense to an action founded in negli-
gence s has been abolished in Nebraska by the comparative negligence
statute,9 which provides:
In all actions brought to recover damages for injuries to a person
or to his property caused by the negligence of another, the fact that
the plaintiff may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not
bar a recover when the contributory negligence of the plaintiff was slight
and the negligence of the defendant was gross in comparison, but the
contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall be considered by the jury
in the mitigation of damages in proportion to the amount of contributory
negligence attributable to the plaintiff; and all questions of negligence
and contributory negligence shall be for the jury.
Assume, for example, that the accident were found to have been caused
10% by the contributory negligence of plaintiff, 50% by the negligence
of Sandoz, the host, and 40% by the negligence of defendant, the third
party driver.10
(1) Is plaintiff's recovery diminished by a comparison of his negli-
gence to the total amount of accident causing negligence-that is, the
ratio of 10% to 100%, or 1/10th, giving the plaintiff a 90% recovery?
(2) Is plaintiff's recovery diminished by a comparison of his negli-
gence to that of the other acting parties-that is, the ratio of 10% to
90%, or 1/9th, giving plaintiff an 88.89% recovery?
(3) Is plaintiff's recovery diminished by a comparison of his negli-
'Restatement, Torts §§ 875-879 (1939).
Restatement, Torts § 880 (1939).
"Robertson v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 108 Neb. 569, 188 N.W. 190 (1922).
Also see Restatement, Torts § 880, comment a, § 888, comment c (1939).
Restatement, Torts § 880, comment a (1939).
"Restatement, Torts §§ 467 et seq. (1934).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1151 (Reissue 1948).10 The particular figures are used for illustrative purposes only. Whether
these percentages would constitute "gross" or "slight" negligence under any
of the requirements of either the motorist's guest statute or the comparative
negligence statute is itself problematical. See particularly the material covered
by notes 51 to 57 infra. Also see Grubb, Comparative Negligence, 32 Neb. L.
Rev. 234, 239-241 (1953).
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gence to the total negligence of plaintiff and the other party to the
suit (in this example, the third party driver)-that is, the ratio of
10% to 50%, or 1/5th, giving the plaintiff an 80% recovery?
(4) Is plaintiff's recovery diminished by a comparison of his negli-
gence to the negligence of the other party to the suit-that is, the ratio
of 10% to 40%, or 1/4th, giving plaintff a 75% recovery?
While the contributory negligence of the automobile guest has been
alleged by the third party in a large number of Nebraska cases," in
only a very few of these has the Supreme Court actually applied the
defense as any sort of a bar to the action. Thus, the issues presented
by these examples have not yet been fully resolved by the Nebraska
court. To attack these problems, this article will first analyze the type
of conduct which may constitute contributory negligence of the guest,
and then analyze the allocation of the guest's damages in a situation
where he has been guilty of such conduct.
Contributory Fault of an Automobile Guest
The duty applied to an automobile guest is a general rule of reason-
ableness of care for one's own safety.' 2 The court will take into con-
" The following contains the bulk of the Nebraska cases, specifically con-
sidering the defense as presented by the third party against the guest, which
have been decided by the Supreme Court: Kuska v. Nichols Construction Co.,
154 Neb. 580, 48 N.W.2d 682 (1951) (dictum: as a matter of law, no contribu-
tory negligence); Hendrix v. Vana, 153 Neb. 531, 45 N.W.2d 429 (1951) (jury
verdict for defendant reversed; as a matter of law, no contributory negligence);
Erickson v. Morrison, 152 Neb. 133, 40 N.W.2d 413 (1950) (refusal to instruct
on contributory negligence, affirmed); Costello v. Hild, 152 Neb. 1, 40 N.W.2d
228 (1949) (no evidence of contributory negligence); Remmenga v. Selk, 150
Neb. 401, 34 N.W.2d 757 (1948) (no evidence of contributory negligence); Allen
v. Clark, 148 Neb. 627, 28 N.W.2d 439 (1947) (no evidence of contributory
negligence); Hamblen v. Steckley, 148 Neb. 283, 27 N.W.2d 178 (1947) (guest
adequately warned host); Huston v. Robinson, 144 Neb. 553, 13 N.W.2d 885
(1944) (warning by co-passenger sufficient); Crandall v. Ladd, 142 Neb. 736,
7 N.W.2d 642 (1943) (error to fail to instruct on contributory negligence);
Fulcher v. Ike, 142 Neb. 418, 6 N.W.2d 610 (1942) (dictum: no evidence of
contributory negligence); O'Brien v. Case Co., 140 Neb. 847, 2 N.W.2d 107
(1942) (no duty to warn); Fischer v. Megan, 138 Neb. 420, 293 N.W. 287 (1940)
(no negligence shown, dictum that guest contributorily negligent); Gleason v.
Baack, 137 Neb. 272, 289 N.W. 349 (1939) (no evidence of contributory negli-
gence); Lewis v. Rapid Transit Lines, 126 Neb. 158, 252 N.W. 804 (1934) (re-
fusal to instruct on contributory negligence, affirmed); Murphy v. Shibiya,
125 Neb. 487, 250 N.W. 746 (1933) (jury verdict for defendant, affirmed);
Tomjack v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 116 Neb. 413, 217 N.W. 944 (1928) (jury verdict
for plaintiff, reversed on grounds of failure to warn).
1
"Sautter v. Poss, 155 Neb. 62, 50 N.W.2d 547 (1951); Kuska v. Nichols Con-
struction Co., 154 Neb. 580, 48 N.W.2d 682 (1951); Hendrix v. Vana, 153 Neb. 531,
45 N.W.2d 429 (1951); Costello v. Hild, 152 Neb. 1, 40 N.W.2d 228 (1949);
Landrum v. Roddy, 143 Neb. 934, 12 N.W.2d 82 (1943). See Lewis v. Rapid
Transit Lines, 126 Neb. 158, 252 N.W. 804 (1934). Cf. Glick v. Poska, 122 Neb.
102, 239 N.W. 626 (1931).
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sideration such factors as weather conditions,13 past knowledge of the
driver and his abilities, 14 the condition of the road, 5 time of day or
night,1 6 the position of the guest in the automobile, 7 traffic condi-
tions,"' the condition of the vehicle,'19 and other miscellaneous factors,
as that the driver had a windshield wiper20 or an unobstructed view21
whereas the guest did not. But to successfully invoke the defense of
contributory negligence to an action by the guest, the defendant has
the burden of showing specific acts of non-reasonable care.2 2
Ordinarily the guest may "reasonably" assume that his host is a
safe and careful driver 23 and a duty to warn exists only in unusual
circumstances. 24 The guest need not normally watch the road or advise
the driver in the management of the car;25 but if he actually perceives
danger, or reasonably should perceive such danger, then he has a
duty to warn the driver.26 The court has stated, as possible exceptions
"Allen v. Clark, 148 Neb. 627, 28 N.W.2d 439 (1947); Murphy v. Shibiya,
125 Neb. 487, 250 N.W. 746 (1933); see Fischer v. Megan, 138 Neb. 420, 293 N.W.
287 (1940) (fog and mist increased duty of care of guest).
" Landrum v. Roddy, 143 Neb. 934, 12 N.W.2d 82 (1943). See Fischer v.
Megan, 138 Neb. 420, 293 N.W. 287 (1940) (fact that host and guest were
strangers increased guest's duty); Komma v. Kreifels, 144 Neb. 745, 14 N.W.2d
591 (1944) (no assumption of risk where guest had previously ridden safely
with host). Also see Note, Assumption of Risk As A Defense In Nebraska
Negligence Actions Under the Comparative Negligence Statute, 30 Neb. L.
Rev. 608 (1951).
M urphy v. Shibiya, 125 Neb. 487, 250 N.W. 746 (1933) (known slippery
road). See Allen v. Clark, 148 Neb. 627, 28 N.W.2d 439 (1947); Kovar v. Bekius,
133 Neb. 487, 275 N.W. 670 (1937).
11 Murphy v. Shibiya, 125 Neb. 487, 250 N.W. 746 (1933) (dark night with
no moon increased guest's duty); Fischer v. Megan, 138 Neb. 420, 293 N.W.
287 (1940).
M Vackechnie v. Lyders, 134 Neb. 682, 279 N.W. 328 (1938); see Tomjack v.
Chicago & N.W. Ry., 116 Neb. 413, 217 N.W. 944 (1928).
218 Allen v. Clark, 148 Neb. 627, 28 N.W.2d 439 (1947); see Erickson v. Morri-
son, 152 Neb. 133, 40 N.W.2d 413 (1950).
11 See Fischer v. Megan, 138 Neb. 420, 293 N.W. 287 (1940) (weak headlights
increase duty of guest).
11 Lewis v. Rapid Transit Lines, 126 Neb. 158, 252 N.W. 804 (1934); also see
Gleason v. Baack, 137 Neb. 272, 289 N.W. 349 (1939).
"I See Lewis v. Rapid Transit Lines, 126 Neb. 158, 252 N.W. 804 (1934).
2 Costello v. Hild, 152 Neb. 1, 40 N.W.2d 228 (1949); Hendren v. Hill, 131
Neb. 163, 267 N.W. 340 (1936).
2"1Erickson v. Morrison, 152 Neb. 133, 40 N.W.2d 413 (1950); Gleason v.
Baack, 137 Neb. 272, 289 N.W. 349 (1939); Kovar v. Beckius, 133 Neb. 487, 275
N.W. 670 (1937). But cf. Fischer v. Megan, 138 Neb. 420, 293 N.W. 287 (1940)
(impliedly placing a heavier duty upon a "stranger").
"1 Huston v. Robinson, 144 Neb. 533, 13 N.W.2d 885 (1944) (dust cutting
visibility to fifteen feet raised such a duty); Fischer v. Megan, 138 Neb. 420,
293 N.W. 287 (1940) (fog, nighttime, and insufficient headlights raised the
duty). See Mackechnie v. Lyders, 134 Neb. 682, 279 N.W. 328 (1938) (excessive
speed raises duty to warn or protest).
H endrix v. Vana, 153" Neb. 531, 45 N.W.2d- 429 (1951); Gleason v. Baack,
137 Neb. 272, 289 N.W. 349 (1939).
"1 Crandall v. Ladd, 142 Neb. 376, 7 N.W.2d 642 (1943); Murphy v. Shibiya,
125 Neb. 487, 250 N.W. 746 (1933); Tomjack v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 116 Neb.
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to this rule, that there is no duty to warn where the warning would
go unheeded or be of no avail, where the driver already has knowl-
edge of the situation, or where the driver has an equal ability to
observe the danger.
2 7
Thus it has been held where the guest testified that she had been
watching the road intently and could see the effect of falling snow
upon visibility, that a jury was justified in denying recovery because
of her contributory negligence in failing to warn of the obvious dangers
and protest for her safety.28 If the guest has been drinking to such
an extent that it is a contributing cause of the accident,29 or permits
himself to ride with one who is known to have been drinking heavily,30
or furnishes liquor to the driver,3 1 he may be guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law. The court has held that under some
circumstances it is contributory negligence as a matter of law to fail
to warn where this is an adequate opportunity.
32
Where a guest saw the third party driver's car a distance from
the intersection and told another passenger that she (the guest) hoped
that the other driver would look where he was going, but made no
warning to the host, it was error to refuse to instruct on contributory
negligence.3 3 But if the driver himself remarks that he sees an obstruc-
tion, then the guest might have no duty to warn.3 4 And if another
passenger in the car fully warns the driver, the plaintiff guest has no
further duty.35 If the guest answers "O.K." in response to the question
413, 217 N.W. 944 (1928). See Kuska v. Nichols Construction Co., 154 Neb. 580,
48 N.W.2d 682 (1951); Costello v. -ild, 152 Neb. 1, 40 N.W.2d 228 (1949);
Hamblen v. Steckley, 148 Neb. 283, 27 N.W.2d 178 (1947); Rogers v. Brown, 129
Neb. 9, 260 N.W. 794 (1935); Behr v. Duling, 128 Neb. 860, 260 N.W. 281 (1935).
"Erickson v. Morrison, 152 Neb. 133, 40 N.W.2d 413 (1950); Hamblen v.
Steckley, 148 Neb. 283, 27 N.W.2d 178 (1947). See Kuska v. Nichols Construction
Co., 154 Neb. 580, 48 N.W.2d 682 (1951); Hendrix v. Vana, 153 Neb. 531, 45
N.W.2d 429 (1951); Fulcher v. Ike, 142 Neb. 418, 6 N.W.2d 610 (1942).
-
8Murphy v. Shibiya, 125 Neb. 487, 250 N.W. 746 (1933).
.- The rule is that the fact that the guest is intoxicated does not per se con-
stitute contributory negligence, nor does it change the general rule of "reason-
able care" for one's own safety. The intoxication must contribute as a proxi-
mate cause of the injury complained of. See Remmenga v. Selk, 150 Neb. 401,
34 N.W.2d 757 (1949); Nichols v. Halvot, 142 Neb. 534, 7 N.W.2d 84 (1942);
McGrath v. Nugent, 133 Neb. 237, 274 N.W. 549 (1937).
31 Landrum v. Roddy, 143 Neb. 934, 12 N.W.2d 82 (1943); McGrath v. Nugent,
133 Neb. 237, 274 N.W. 549 (1937). But cf. Koma v. Kreifels, 144 Neb. 745, 14
N.W.2d 591 (1944) (guest must have knowledge of past acts of recklessness
by host).
"
1McGrath v. Nugent, 133 Neb. 237, 274 N.W. 549 (1937). See Landrum v.
Roddy, 143 Neb. 934, 12 N.W.2d 82 (1943).
31 Tomjack v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 116 Neb. 413, 217 N.W. 944 (1928) (re-
versing jury verdict for plaintiff).
31 Crandall v. Ladd, 142 Neb. 736, 7 N.W.2d 642 (1943).
3'James v. Krebeck, 141 Neb. 73, 2 N.W.2d 629 (1942), vacated on other
grounds, 142 Neb. 757, 7 N.W.2d 637 (1943).
3Huston v. Robinson, 144 Neb. 553, 13 N.W.2d 885 (1944).
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of whether the driver should pass another car,36 or states that there are
no cars coming from his direction at an intersection,37 he may be barred
by his contributory negligence, although in the particular cases involv-
ing these issues, the defendant could not establish sufficient facts to
get the defense to the jury.
A guest does not have to warn of bushes along the side of the road
even though they may obstruct view, for they are equally apparen.t
to the host,38 and similar reasoning was applied to a case where the
driver of the car ahead of host's suddenly stopped to pick up two
women hitchhikers. 9 The guest does not have to watch for cars at an
intersection,40 or street markers,41 or pay attention to traffic.42 It is
not sufficient contributory negligence to go to a jury to show that
plaintiff sat sidewise43 or slumped over44 in the seat, failed to see a
pile of gravel on a road, around which there were no barricades or
markers,45 or was "somewhat drowsy."46 It was error to instruct that
as a matter of law the guest had a duty to object to a speed of 85 to
90 miles per hour.47 And a jury found no contributory negligence
where, after an accident, the car hit a culvert, stopped, tilted on a
ledge, and then toppled over on plaintiff as he attempted to get out.48
- Also, it was held that there was no negligence sufficient to go to
a jury upon the mere showing that when host's car stalled in a lane
of traffic, the guest'failed to get out after seeing defendant's car a
block and a half away,49 or that the guest stayed in the car for about
a minute after it stopped on a- country road at night. 0
If any ratio decidiendi may be drawn from these cases, it is that
there are many ways in which the court has stated that a guest may
"See Kovar v. Bekius, 133 Neb. 487, 275 N.W. 670 (1937) (Someone in car
said "O.K." in answer to driver's question. Held: since it was not shown that
plaintiff had made the statement, and since the time lag had not been over
five seconds, plaintiff had not acquiesced in the negligent conduct of the
driver.).
17 Costello v. Hild, 152 Neb. 1, 40 N.W. 2d 228 (1949).
"Erickson v. Morrison, 152 Neb. 133, 40 N.W.2d 413 (1950).
- O'Brien v. Case Co., 140 Neb. 847, 2 N.W.2d 107 (1942).
,0 Frickson v Morrison, 152 Neb. 133, 40 N.W.2d 413 (1950).
" Erickson v. Morrison, 152 Neb. 133, 40 N.W.2d 413 (1950).
"-2 Hendrix v. Vana, 153 Neb. 531, 45 N.W.2d 429 (1951). See Gleason v.
Baack, 137 Neb. 272, 289 N.W. 349 (1939).
"Hendrix v. Vana, 153 Neb. 531, 45 N.W.2d 429 (1951).
"Gleason v. Baack, 137 Neb. 272, 289 N.W. 349 (1939).
"Kuska v. Nichols Construction Co., 154 Neb. 580, 48 N.W.2d 682 (1951).
"Gleason v. Baack, 137 Neb. 272, 289 N.W. 349 (1939).
- "Sautter v. Poss, 155 Neb. 62, 50 -N.W.2d 547 (1951).
Glick v. Poska, 122 Neb. 102, 239 N.W. 626 (1931).
"Allen v. Clark, 148 Neb. 627, 28 N.W.2d 439 (1947).
"° Remmenga v. Selk, 150 Neb. 401, 34 N.W.2d 757 (1948). See Landrum
v. Roddy, 143 Neb. 934, 12 N.W.2d 82 (194a) (not negligence as -a matter of
law ,to fail to get out at filling station when driver stopped for gas; but, under
the circumstances, sufficient-facts- shown to go to the jury).
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be contributorily negligent, but as a practical matter, at least in the
appellate court, it has been an extremely difficult burden to specifically
pinpoint conduct which constitutes contributory negligence of a guest
in any given situation. And the more recent cases seem to have been
much more stringent in applying the law to the facts. While the court
has talked in terms of placing a duty of "reasonable care" on the guest,
as a practical matter the duty has been rather insignificant. As a result,
under the present status of Nebraska law, to invoke the defense of
contributory negligence against an automobile guest would seem
to reguire a greater showing of "fault" than to effectively set up the
defense against other plaintiffs generally.
Apporijonment of Damages of a Contributorily Negligent Automobile Guest
Even though the guest may not have been contributorily negligent,
still to maintain a suit against his host, the motorist's guest statute
requires him to show "gross negligence" 51 on the part of the host.5 2
The host may utilize the defense of contributory negligence, 53 however,
if he can show specific non-reasonable acts by the guest.5 4
Where a suit is maintainable by a guest against the host, with no
third party drivers involved in the accident, there is an issue as to
whether the negligence of the guest is compared to the total amount
of accident contributing negligence of the parties, or merely to the
negligence of the host. Actually, two different comparisons seem to be
11 Under this statute, "Gross negligence means great or excessive negligence;
that is, negligence in a very high degree. It indicates the absence of even slight
care in the performance of a duty." Montgomery v. Ross, 156 Neb. 875, 58
N.W. 2d 340 (1953); Bishop v. Schofield, 156 Neb. 830, 58 N.W.2d 207 (1953). But
under the comparative negligence statute, "The words 'slight' and 'gross' are
comparative terms and the intent of the statute is that the negligence of the
parties shall be compared one with the other... ." Andelt v. County of Seward,
157 Neb. 527, 60 N.W.2d 604 (1953). Quaere: Is "gross as compared with" a
greater, smaller, or the same degree of negligence as just plain "gross"
negligence?
"Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-740 (Reissue 1952); Gohlinghorst v. Ruess, 146 Neb.
470, 20 N.W.2d 381 (1945); James v. Krebeck, 142 Neb. 757, 7 N.W.2d 637 (1943);
Holberg v. McDonald, 137 Neb. 405, 289 N.W. 542 (1940); Munsell v. Gardner,
136 Neb. 214, 285 N.W. 555 (1939).
"Sautter v. Poss, 155 Neb. 62, 50 N.W.2d 547 (1951); Landrum v. Roddy,
143 Neb. 934, 12 N.W.2d 82 (1943), overruling Sheely v. Abboud, 126 Neb.
554, 253 N.W. 683 (1934).
" The initial burden of proof of negligence is on the plaintiff; but the burden
of proving contributory negligence is on the defendant. However, "After the
parties establish and the jury, under proper instructions, finds the respective
parties guilty of actionable negligence and contributory negligence the respon-
sibility is then on the jury to make the comparison as contemplated by the
statute. This comparison, is to determine the rights of the parties to recover,
if at all, and the extent therof. In this respect there is no burden of proof
on either party but solely a duty on the part of the jury to make the proper
comparisons on the evidence before them." See Murray v. Pearson Appliance
Store, 155 Neb. 860, 875, 54 N.W.2d 250, 259 (1952).
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involved. First, as to whether the statute is applicable to the spe-
cific facts or not, it appears settled that the comparison is simply one
of plaintiff's negligence to that of the defendant.55 But, second, once
it is determined that the statute does have application to the facts,
the comparison used to allocate the damages is one between plaintiff's
negligence and the total accident contributing negligence of the parties.
This difference in the type of the comparison required for the different
purposes seems substantiated by the particular wording of the statutes
as respects its application, 6 and the apportionment of damages after it
is determined that the provisions do apply.57 This article deals only
with the second of these comparisons-that used for the allocation of
damages.
In one Nebraska case, a Supreme Court Justice stated that if de-
fendant was four times as negligent as plaintiff, then plaintiff was en-
titled to a recovery of 4/5ths (rather than 3/4ths) of his total dam-
ages.58 But in another opinion, another Justice stated that if the de-
fendant is six times as negligent as plaintiff, the recovery should be
diminished by 1/6th (rather than 1/7th).59 The wording of the compara-
tive negligence statute, ". . the mitigation of damages in proportion
to the amount of contributory negligence attributable to the plaintiff
.," would seem equally susceptible to either interpretation.
But in the recent decision in Murray v. Pearson Appliance Store,60
the court cited both of these cases for the proposition that the com-
parison is between plaintiff's and the combined negligence of the
parties:
" Andelt v. County of Seward,.157 Neb. 527, 60 N.W.2d 604 (1953); Murray
v. Pearson Appliance Store, 155 Neb. 860, 54 N.W.2d 250 (1952); Roby v.
Auker, 151 Neb. 421, 37 N.W.2d 799 (1949).
"Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1151 (Reissue 1948) ("...when the contributory
negligence of the plaintiff was slight and the negligence of the defendant was
-gross in comparison..."); Andelt v. County of Seward, 157 Neb. 527, 530,
60 N.W.2d 604, 606 (1953), quoting from Roby v. Auker, 151 Neb. 421, 37 N.W.2d
799 (1949) (The legislature "'... clearly intended the words 'in comparison' as
qualifying both of the clauses immediately preceding. The words 'slight! and
'gross' as used in the statute are comparative terms and the intent of the
statute is that the negligence of the parties shall be compared one with the
other in determining questions of slight and gross negligence."').
" Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1151 (Reissue 1948) ("... the mitigation of damages
in proportion to the amount of contributory negligence attributable to the
plaintiff.. ").
1s Sgroi v. Yellow Cab & Baggage Co., 124 Neb. 525, 528, 247 N.W. 355, 356
(1933) ("The combined negligence of the two causes the total damage sus-
tained. It is plain in such a case that plaintiff's own negligence caused one-fifth
of her injury and defendant's four-fifths...." ). See Morrison v. Scotts Bluff
County, 104 Neb. 254, 177 N.W. 158 (1920). Accord: Prosser, Comparative Neg-
ligence, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 465, 481-482 (1953).
1o Patterson v. Kerr, 127 Neb. 73, 79, 254 N.W. 704, 707 (1934). Accord:
Grubb, Comparative Negligence, 32 Neb. L. Rev. 234, 238-239 (1953).
155 Neb. 860, 868, 54 N.W.2d 250, 259 (1952).
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When plaintiff is entitled to recover under this rule it then becomes
the duty of the jury to deduct from the total amount of any damages
which it determines he has sustained such an amount as his contributory
negligence bears to the entire negligence of the parties which contributed
thereto.
The Federal Employer's Liability Act"' has served as the basis for
a number of state acts, both in the labor and other fields, 62 and the
Nebraska comparative negligence statute seems to have been closely
tailored along the pattern of its wording, with the addition of the
slight-gross comparison. In a long line of cases in the United States
Supreme Court,63 lower federal courts,64 and state courts, 65 under the
act, the wording, "... the damages shall be diminished by the jury in
proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to such employee
.," has specifically been held to require a comparison of the negli-
gence of the injured workman with the combined negligence of de-
fendant and himself. However, under this statute,66 as under Missis-
sippi,67 Georgia,68 Nebraska,69 and possibly South Dakota, 0 statutes,
an instruction using simply the wording of the statute without a more
6135 Stat. 66 (1908), 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1946): "...the fact that the employee
may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery,
but the damages shall be diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount
of negligence attributable to such employee .... )
See Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 465, 478-480 (1953).
Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Tilghman, 237 U.S. 499 (1915); Norfolk &
W. R.R. v. Earnest, 299 U.S. 114, 121-122 (1913). See Grand Trunk Ry. v.
Lindsay, 233 U.S. 42, 49 (1914).
64 Keith v. Wheeling & L.E. Ry., 160 F.2d 654 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 332
U.S. 763 (1947); Buchanan v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., 159 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1947);
Katila v. B. & 0. R.R., 104 F.2d 842, 843 (6th Cir. 1939).
; Sprickerhoff v. B. & 0. R.R., 323 IlI. App. 340, 55 N.E.2d 532 (1944); Clift
v. S.L.-S.F. Ry., 320 Mo. 791, 9 S.W.2d 972 (1928); Lierness v. L.I. R.R., 217 App.
Div. 301, 216 N.Y. Supp. 656 (2d Dep't 1926); McAuliffe v. N.Y. Cent. R.R.,
172'App. Div. 597, 158 N.Y. Supp. 922 (2d Dep't 1916); Koofos v. G. N. Ry., 41
ND. 176,170 N.W. 859 (1918); Chadwick v. Oregon-Washington Ry. & Naviga-
lion ,Co.; 74 Ore. 19, 144 Pac. 1165 (1914); Waina v. Penn. Co., 251 Pa. 213,
D6 AtL 461 (1915).
. 'See Warren v. Jackson, 204 Ill. App. 576, 589 (1917); Kippenbrock v.
lWabash Ry., 270 Mo: 479, 194 S.W. 50 (1917); Western & A. R.R., 36 Ga. App.
70, 135 S.E. 439 (1926); Cent. of Georgia Ry. v. Lindsay, 28 Ga. App. 198, 110
S.E. 636 (1922). Contra: Cincinnati N.O. & T.P. Ry., 163 Ky. 60, 173 S.W. 329
(1915) (citing 'other Kentucky cases); Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 168 Ky. 137,
181 S.W.'933 (1916).
67 See Clary v. Breyer, 194 Miss. 612, 13 So.2d 633 (1943); Watson v. Holi-
mon, 169 Miss. 585, 153 So. 669 (1934); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Archer, 113 Miss.
158, 74 So. 135 (1917).
68 See Southern Ry. v. Reed, 40 Ga. App. 332, 149 S.E. 582 (1929); Augusta-
Aiken Ry. & Elec. Corp. v. Burdashaw, 27 Ga. App. 657, 109 S.E. 530 (1921).
69 See Patterson v. Kerr, 127 Neb. 73, 254 N.W. 704 (1934); Kelso v. Seward
County, 117 Neb. 136, 219 N.W. 843 (1928); Morrison v. Scotts Bluff County,
104 Neb. 254, 177 N.W. 158 (1920). Also see, e.g., Transcript of Record, p. 17,
Nat. Fire Ins. Co. v. Evertson, 157 Neb. 540, 60 N.W.2d. 638 (1953).
7 0See.Foland v. Dugon, 57 N.W.2d 166 (S.D. 1953). That South Dakota
will follow Nebraska comparative negligence decisions as a guide, has been
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precise explanation of the mathematical allocation has been permitted.
Early language inadvertently used in a Wisconsin opinion indicating
that the comparison might be only the ratio of plaintiffs negligence
to defendant's negligence71 was withdrawn in later decisions 2
If the underlying policy behind the comparative negligence statute
is an attempt to base liability upon fault,73 then it would seem that
a defendant six times as much at fault as the plaintiff should bear six
times the liability, that is 6/7ths of the loss, and not merely five times
the amount, or 5/6ths of the loss. And the instructions normally given
in the Nebraska trial courts,74 and which have received at least implied
if not express approval by the Supreme Court,75 set up the comparison
as between plaintiff's and total negligence. It would seem probable
that if a case with the issue squarely framed were put to the Supreme
Court as the law stands today, especially the language of the opinion in
Murray v. Pearson Appliance Store, the ruling would be to compare
the negligence of plaintiff with the total accident contributing negli-
gence of the parties.
But in the three party situation, the problem becomes more com-
plex because of the rule that each joint tortfeasor is generally liable
for the entire indivisible damages suffered by plaintiff, even though
the other tortfeasor may have a complete defense,7 6 and even though
he, himself, without the other tortfeasor, could not possibly have caused
settled in a long line of cases, see Stone v. Hinsvark, 57 N.W.2d 669 (S.D. 1953);
Roberts v. Brown, 72 S.D. 479, 36 N.W.2d 665 (1949); Friese v. Gulbrandson, 69
S.D. 179, 8 N.W.2d 438 (1943); Audiss v. Peter Kiewitt Sons, 190 F.2d 238 (8th
Cir. 1951).71Paluczak v. Jones, 209 Wis. 640, 245 N.W. 655 (1932).
7- Cameron v. Union Automobile Ins. Co., 210 Wis. 659, 247 N.W. 454 (1933);
Engebrecht v. Bradley, 211 Wis, 1, 247 N.W. 451 (1933).
11 See Gregory, Legislative Loss Distribution In Negligence Actions cc.
VII, IX (1936).
. " See Standardized Jury Instructions, Adopted By the Association of Dis-
trict Judges of Nebraska, Nos. 63465, pp. 56-68 (1949) (... deduct from the
whole amount of the damages, if any, sustained by the plaintiff such proportion
thereof as the negligence chargeable to him bears to the entire negligence
as shown by the evidence....").
" See, e.g., Murray v. Pearson Appliance Store, 155 Neb. 860, 54 N.W.2d
250 (1952) (Instruction: "To establish the amount of such reduction, you will
first determine the proportion which the amount of plaintiff's negligence bears
to the total amount of negligence of both parties, and express such proportion
either in a fractional or percentage form. Such fraction or percentage is then
applied to the total amount of damages previously found by you, to determine
the part of such damage which was caused by plaintiff's own negligence. The
sum thus determined is then deducted from plaintiffs total damages, and your
verdict should be for the amount remaining.").
76 Segebart v. Gregory, 156 Neb. 261, 55 N.W.2d 678 (1952); Huston v. Robin-
son, 144 Neb. 553, 13 N.W.2d 885 (1944); Andrews v. Clapper,. 133 Neb. 110,
274 N.W. 209 (1937); Robertson v. Chicago, B. & Q.. R.R., 108 Neb. 569, 188
N.W. 190 (1922).
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all of the damage.7 7 The rule is stated that one joint tortfeasor is
liable for the damage caused by the other, although he is not responsi-
ble for the negligence of the other tortfeasor.7 8 In other words, even
though one tortfeasor is not legally responsible for the act of the other
(as, for example, being in a position to control), still he is legally liable
for the total damage suffered by the injured party. The apparent rea-
son for this rule is that as between two parties, one of whom was "at
fault" and the other not, the one who caused the harm should pay
for it. The criterion here is a basing of the loss upon the fault of the
parties insofar as there is fault or non-fault. "Fault" is defined as the
deviation from the standard norm of so-called reasonable human con-
duct.7
9
Presumably this is the same type of philosophy which underlies
the comparative negligence theory. As between two parties who are
both "at fault," to the extent that one has made a "gross" deviation
from the standard norm and the other merely a "slight" deviation by
comparison, the incidence of the loss should be allocated in the same
proportion as the deviation.
This same reasoning would appear to justify contribution among
joint tortfeasors to the extent of the "fault" of each.80 But it seems
to be both the judicial8 l as well as the legislative policy8 2 of the state
to refuse such contribution, although there is an indication to the con-
trary in a few decisions.8 3 Thus, the Nebraska rule is apparently one
71 Stark v. Turner, 154 Neb. 268, 47 N.W.2d 569 (1951); Umberger v. Sankey,
151 Neb. 488, 38 N.W.2d 21 (1949); Whitney v. Penrod, 149 Neb. 636, 32 N.W.2d
131 (1948); Huston v. Robinson, 144 Neb. 553, 13 N.W.2d 885 (1944); McClelland
v. Interstate Transit Lines, 142 Neb. 439, 6 N.W.2d 384 (1942); Bergendahl v.
Rabeler, 133 Neb. 699, 276 N.W. 673 (1937); Andrews v. Clapper, 133 Neb.
110, 274, N.W. 209 (1937); Rogers v. Brown, 129 Neb. 9, 260 N.W. 794 (1935)
(where host grossly negligent, he is liable for whole of guest's damage);
Zielinski v. Dolan, 127 Neb. 153, 254 N.W. 695 (1934); Andromidas v. Theisen
Bros., 94 F. Supp. 150 (D. Neb. 1950).
11 "Where the independent tortious act of two persons combine to produce
an injury indivisible in its nature, either tortfeasor may be held for the entire
damage-not because he is responsible for the act of the other, but because
his own act is regarded in law as a cause of the injury." Davis v. Spindler,
156 Neb. 276, 56 N.W.2d 107 (1952); Stark v. Turner, 154 Neb. 268, 47 N.W.2d
569 (1951); Husky Refining Co. v. Barnes, 119 F.2d 715 (9th Cir. 1941).
"See Prosser, Torts 226, 428 (1941).
8See Gregory, Legislative Loss Distribution In Negligence Actions 72 et
seq. (1936).
"For a comprehensive collection and analysis of the Nebraska decisions,
see Andromidas v. Theisen Bros., 94 F. Supp. 150 (D. Neb. 1950).
" A number of bills have been proposed in recent sessions of the Nebraska
Legislature, but have not been passed. The Nebraska State Bar Association
has been behind the effort to secure such legislation.
83 See First Nat. Bank v. Avery Planter Co., 69 Neb. 329, 95 N.W. 622 (1903);
George's Radio v. Capital Transit Co., 126 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1942). But cf.
Andromidas v. Theisen Bros., 94 F. Supp. 150 (D. Neb. 1950) (factually dis-
tinguishing these cases). Also see Note, When May A Defendant Bring In A
Third Party In Nebraska, 32 Neb. L. Rev. 407, 412-413 (1953).
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of comparative fault as between plaintiff and defendants, but as
between the defendants themselves, the all-or-nothing view of the com-
mon law still prevails,4 and it is error for a jury to attempt to appor-,
tion the damages as between the joint tortfeasors. 5
A number of writers have suggested that the logical solution in
the three party situation is simply to bring all the parties before the
court and apportion the total losses on the basis of comparative fault.8 0
Granted that this might be a theoretically desirable concept, still as
a practical matter in a jurisdiction not having any of these rules or
procedures available, the problem of an action against less than all
of the joint tortfeasors is an actual and important practical situation in
securing the rights of the parties involved. And one or more phases
of such a problem would be present in every guest suit wherein it
is alleged that the guest has been contributorily negligent.
The precise issue of whether, in such a suit against only one of the
joint tortfeasors, the comparison is between plaintiff's negligence and
the negligence of (1) all of the parties, (2) the joint tortfeasors, (3)
plaintiff and defendant before the court, or (4) defendant before
the court, has not yet been answered by any Nebraska appellate deci-
sion. Dean Prosser in a comprehensive analysis of comparative negli-
gence cases has recently noted that there were "... astonishingly few
cases in which the question of multiple parties has reached the ap-
pellate courts under any 'comparative negligence' act. '8 7 Dean Prosser
cites only four cases ss in which one defendant was liable to the
plaintiff while the other joint tortfeasor had a complete defense. In
all of these, it was held that the recovery against the single defendant
to the suit should be reduced by a comparison of plaintiff's negligence
to the total negligence of all of the parties (number (1) above).
See Gregory, Legislative Loss Distribution In Negligence Actions 72-73
(1936).85 Forslund v. Swenson, 110 Neb. 188, 192 N.W. 649 (1923); Olson v. Neb.
Tel. Co., 87 Neb. 593, 127 N.W. 916 (1910).
11 See Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 465, 503-504
(1953); Gregory, Legislative Loss Distribution In Negligence Actions 80 et seq.,
114-115 (1936); Philbrick, Loss Apportionment In Negligence Cases, 99 U. of
Pa. L. Rev. 766, 811 (1951). See Whelan, Comparative Negligence, 1938 Wis. L.
Rev. 465, 487-490. Also see Prosser, Torts 407 .(1941); Gregory, Loss Distribu-
tion By Comparative Negligence, 21 Minn. L. Rev. 1 (1936).87 Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 465, 507 (1953).
88 Walker v. Kroger Groc. & Baking Co., 214 Wis. 519, 252 N.W. 721 (1934)
(... inasmuch as that provision does clearly limit the one term of the pro-
portion to 'the negligence attributable to the person recovering,' the language
of the statute does not admit of including in that term of the proportion [of]
causal negligence which is attributable solely to some other participant, and
not to the person recovering. As a result, the causal negligence of all the other
participants in the transaction must be deemed to constitute the other term of
the proportion."); Quady v. Sickl, 260 Wis. 348, 51 N.W.2d 3 (1952); Smith V.
Am. Oil Co., 77 Ga. App. 463, 49 S.E.2d 90 (1948); Mishoe v. Davis, 64 Ga. App.
700, 14 S.E.2d 187 (1941).
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A similar problem is presented under state statutes and the Fed-
eral Employer's Liability Act, where it is the rule that contributory
.negligende will bar an action against a fellow servant. The cases still
allow a contributorily negligent worker to recover the full amount
from the employer, diminished only by a comparison of his negligence
to the total amount of accident contributing negligence, including that
of the fellow servants.8 9 Other cases seem to have reached the same
result without considering the comparative fault apportionment prob-
lemY0 However, in two cases where the host was not made a party
to the suit, it was held error to compare the negligence of plaintiff
merely with that of the parties to the suit rather than the total of all
three acting parties, but the error was not prejudicial to the third party
driver defendant since it worked in his favor.9 1
The same general approach is apparently being followed in those
Nebraska trial courts utilizing the Standardized Jury Instructions
adopted by the Association of District Judges.9 2 The instruction states:
NEGLIGENCE OF PERSON NOT PARTY TO THE ACTION
... If you find that AB was negligent and that his negligence was a
part of the proximate cause of said accident and plaintiff's damage, then
you should consider the negligence of AB and compare the negligence
of the plaintiff with the combined negligence of all the negligent persons
and deduct from the whole amount of damages, if any, sustained by the
plaintiff such proportion thereof as the contributory negligence chargeable
to the plaintiff bears to the entire negligence as shown by the evidence
and return a verdict for the balance only.
If the theory behindthe comparative negligence statute is one of
allocating the loss on the basis of comparative fault of the parties-
even within the narrow limits of the slight-gross comparison-then
it would seem that the comparison under the Nebraska statute should
involve only those parties actually before the court in the particular
action.93 The statements made by the court in joint tortfeasor cases
where no contributory negligence is involved, that each is liable for
the damage but not the negligence of the other tortfeasor, would seem
to mean that although one tortfeasor has to pay for the total damage
8 9Katila v. B. & 0. R.R., 104 F.2d 842, 843 (6th Cir. 1939).
"See Note, 92 A.L.R. 691 (1934).
"Patterson v. Edgerton Sand & Gravel Co., 227 Wis. 11, 277 N.W. 636 (1938);
Ross v. Koberstein, 220 Wis. 73, 264 N.W. 642 (1936).
" Standardized Instructions To Juries-1953 Cumulative Supplement, No.
21, infra p. 125.
'8 Bt cf. Katila v. B. & 0. R.R., 104 F.2d 842, 843 (6th Cir. 1939) ("But once
there is introduced into the law, as here, the doctrine of comparative negli-
gence, then there may not be adequate assay of total negligence unless all
negligence supported by'evidence is given' consideration."). To the same effect
is 3 Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 252, § 2(2) (1950), specifically dealing with the auto-
mobile guest problem. The Ontario statute is the most complete comparative
negligence statute.
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of plaintiff, still as a matter of comparative negligence or comparative
fault he is not responsible for the other's negligence. Thus, a more
proper method of allocation would appear to be to make the third
party driver initially liable for all of the guest's damage, and then to
mitigate such recovery by a comparison of the guest's negligence to
the combined negligence of only the guest and the defendant to the
suit.
Following through on this type of a solution would mean, however,
that plaintiff's recovery would be for a different amount depending
upon whether or not he could get both of the tortfeasors before the
court. The more parties-defendant which the guest could bring in,
the smaller would be the comparative percentage of his own negli-
gence. Referring back to the example used above, where the guest's
negligence contributed 10% to the accident, the hosts's 50% and the
third party driver's 40%, the guest would receive an 80% recovery in
an action against the third party driver alone (the ratio of 10% to the
total negligence of plaintiff and defendant), but a 90% recovery in an
action against both the host and third party driver.
At first it might seem as if the third party driver is being made
liable for the host's negligence as well as the damage since he is made
jointly and severally liable for an added 10% in damages above that
which in an action against him alone he could be forced to pay. But,
actually it is merely the damage for which the third party driver is
being made liable under the joint tortfeasor rules. It is true that the
third -party driver is being forced to pay an amount which is more
than the comparative percentage of his fault in the over-all accident.
This is the very same problem which is involved in a suit by a non-
negligent guest against one joint tortfeasor and not the other, and is
simply a corollary of the rule that in a suit by a non-negligent plaintiff,
the third party driver is liable for all the damages, even those caused
by another joint tortfeasor having a complete defense to an action
by the plaintiff. It is this precise type of situation which the contribu-
tion among joint tortfeasors-statutes and decisions have been designed
to remedy in an effort to balance liability with fault.94 But Nebraska
does not have such a rule at present, and until the -Legislature acts
to correct- this situation by- more liberal contribution and impleader
devices, there will be this apparent inequity as between defendants.
- Also, the trial court has the duty to instruct the jury on how the
allocation of damages is to be made; and the failure to do so is rever-
sible error.95 Under the above rules, the following instruction would
seem to embody at least a technically accurate statement of the law
in a suit by the guest against the third party driver alone:
9, See Gregory, Legislative Loss" Distribution In Negligence Actions 72
(1936).
. Murray v. Pearson Appliance Store, 155 Neb. 860, 54 N.W.2d 250 (1952),.
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COMPUTATION OF THE DAMAGES
You are instructed that if the negligence of the defendant,
if you find there was any, caused or proximately contributed
to the collision, then you should:
First: Determine the total amount of the damages which
the plaintiff suffered in the collision from all causes.
Second: Determine whether or not the plaintiff was con-
tributorily negligent. If the plaintiff was not contributorily
negligent, then your verdict should be for the total amount
of the damages suffered by him.
Third: 96 If you find that the plaintiff was contributorily
negligent, then you should compare the negligence of the
plaintiff and defendant and by this comparison determine
whether the negligence of the plaintiff was slight and that
of the defendant was gross. This is a matter of comparison
involving only the plaintiff and the defendant to this suit.
If you find from all the evidence in the case that, by such
a comparison, the negligence of the plaintiff was slight and
the negligence of the defendant was gross, then the plaintiff
is entitled to recover, but his recovery is to be reduced by
the proportionate amount which his negligence bears to the
total amount of negligence of both the plaintiff and de-
fendant.
If you find from the evidence that both parties were neg-
ligent, the plaintiff cannot recover in this case if you find
from the evidence that by comparing the negligence of the
plaintiff with the negligence of the defendant, the negligence
of the plaintiff was more than "slight" or the negligence of
the defendant was Zess than "gross."
If you find from the evidence that the defendant was not
negligent, then you should return a verdict for the de-
fendant.
Of course, the instruction would need to be supported with the
normal definitions and supplementary rules dealing with negligence,
as well as the other law applicable to the case such as last clear chance,
the emergency doctrine, intoxication, and assumption of risk.
To aid somewhat in lessening the complexity of such a computation
of damages, it has been highly recommended that the device of the
special interrogatory 7 be used in these situations.98 This would not
0' See Andelt v. County of Seward, 157 Neb. 527, 60 N.W.2d 604 (1953); Mur-
ray v. Pearson Appliance Store, 155 Neb. 860, 54 N.W.2d 250 (1952); Roby v.
Auker, 151 Neb. 421, 37 N.W.2d 799 (1949).
Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-1120 to 25-1122 (Reissue 1948).
Gregory, Legislative Loss Distribution In Negligence Actions 121-124
(1936); Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 465, 497 et seq.
APPORTIONMENT OF GUEST'S DAMAGES
only assist a jury in threading through the maze of complex rules, but
might correct an error in computation without the cost of a second
trial, since the special finding would control the general verdictY9
Error cannot normally be predicated upon the failure to give these
instructions to the jury, however, unless there is an abuse of discretion
of the same type as that in refusing to give instructions generally100
If a lower court were to submit special interrogatories to the jury,
then these illustrate the type which might be used: 01
QUESTION 1: .Was the defendant .......................... , negli-
gent in any of the following respects:
A. With respect to the speed at which he operated his
automoble?
Answer:
Dissenting:
B. With respect to keeping a proper lookout?
Answer:
Dissenting:
C. With respect to the control of his automobile?
Answer:
Dissenting:
QUESTION 2: If you answer any subdivison of Question
1 "Yes," then answer the corresponding subdivisions of this
question:
Was such negligence on the part of the defendant,
............................ , a contributing cause in fact of the collision?
A. Answer:
Dissenting:
B. Answer:
Dissenting:
C. Answer:
Dissenting:
(1953); Grubb, Comparative Negligence, 32 Neb. L. Rev. 234, 242-243 (1953).
See McAuliffe v. N.Y. Cent. R.R., 172 App. Div. 597, 158 N.Y. Supp. 922 (2d
Dep't 1916); Schumacher v. Wolf, 247 Wis. 607, 20 N.W.2d 579 (1945)
"
9Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1120 (Reissue 1948); Sohler v. Chistensen, 151 Neb.
843, 39 N.W.2d 837 (1949); Culbertson Irrigating & Water Power Co. v. Olander,
51 Neb. 539, 71 N.W. 298 (1897).
"I Buel v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 81 Neb. 430, 166 N.W. 299 (1908); Am.
Fire Ins. Co. v. Landfare, 56 Neb. 482, 75 N.W. 1068 (1898); Phoenix Ins. Co. v.
King, 52 Neb. 562, 72 N.W. 855 (1897). See other cases noted under Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 25-1121 (Reissue 1948).
"I See Augustin v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Transp. Co., 259 Wis. 625, 49
N.W.2d 730 (1951); Murray v. Pearson Appliance Store, 155 Neb. 860, 54
N.W.2d 250 (1952); Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 465,
497-500 (1953); Grubb, Comparative Negligence, 32 Neb. L. Rev. 234, 242-243
(1953). Also see Andelt v. County of Seward, 157 Neb. 427, 60 N.W.2d 604
(1953); Waina v. Penn. Co., 251 Pa. 213, 96 Atl 461 (1915). But cf. Foemmel v.
Mueller, 255 Wis. 277, 38 N.W.2d 510 (1949); Schumacher v. Wolf, 247 Wis.
607, 20 N.W.2d 579 (1945).
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QUESTION 3: Was the plaintiff .................................. , negli-
gent in any of the following respects:
A. With respect to keeping a proper lookout?
Answer:
Dissenting:
B. With respect to warning the driver of the vehicle in
which he was riding?
Answer:
Dissenting:
C. With respect to advising in the management of the
vehicle in which he was riding?
Answer:
Dissenting:
QUESTION 4: If you answer any subdivision of Question
3 "Yes," then answer the corresponding subdivision of this
question:
Was such negligence on the part of the plaintiff,
.............................. , a contributing cause in fact of the collision?
A. Answer:
Dissenting:
B. Answer:
Dissenting:
C. Answer:
Dissenting:
QUESTION 5: If you have answered "Yes" to any sub-
division of each of the preceding four questions, then answer
the following question:
When comparing the negligence of the plaintiff .............
with the negligence of the defendant .......................... , was
the negligence of the plaintiff slight and the negligence of
the defendant gross?
Answer:
Dissenting:
QUESTION 6: If you have answered "Yes" to Question
5 (the preceeding question), then, answer the following
question:
What proportion of the negligence, if any, which caused or
proximately contributed to the collision was attributable to:
A. The defendant ...................................
Answer:
Dissenting:
B .The plaintiff, ...................................Answer:
Dissenting:
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QUESTION 7: What is th6 total-'amount of injuries and
-damages which plaintiff ......... ....... , has" suffered
as a direct and proximate result of the collision?
Answer:
-Dissenting:
Conclusion
For a defendant to invoke the defense of contributory negligence
against an automobile guest, he must specifically establish certain
negligent acts or conduct on the part of the guest. There seems to have
been somewhat of a judicial reluctance to actually impose a substan-
tial duty to act upon the automobile guest.
But once such a degree of socially reprehensible conduct is shown,
it would seem that to solve the problems in the examples stated at
the beginning of this note, there are three basic problems which would
need to be answered with respect to the apportionment:
(1) In a two party accident and suit, should the comparison of
negligence be the ratio between that of plaintiff and the total of the
parties, or merely the ratio of plaintiff's negligence to that of de-
fendant?
(2) In a multiple party accident where less than all of the joint
tortfeasors are made parties-defendant, should the comparison be made
solely with respect to the negligence of the parties to the suit, or the
total amount of all of the acting parties in the accident?
(3) In a multiple party accident where all the tortfeasors are
parties to the suit, how shall the comparison be made?
On none of these issues is there any sort of a definitive answer in
the Nebraska statutes or decisions.
Although the two cases specifically decided in answer to the first
question are diametrically opposing, it would seem that the Nebraska
court would rule that the comparison should be made between plain-
tiff's negligence and the total amount of both of the parties involved.
In a suit of the type discussed in the examples set out above where
the plaintiff sues one joint tortfeasor and the other has a complete
defense to an action by the plaintiff, the proper method of resolving
the problem under existing Nebraska law would seem to be to: (1)
initiaily make the defendant-joint-tortfeasor liable for all of plaintiff's
damage, and then (2) mitigate such damage -by a comparison of
plaintiff's negligence to the total amount of accident contributing neg-
ligence by both the plaintiff and defendant, without regard to the
'negligent acts of others not a party'to the suit.
In the suit where all of the parties are brought before the court,
the comparison under Nebraska law should be made between the
plaintiff's negligence and the total amount of accident contributing
negligence of all of the parties..
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While these rules seem to produce desirable results under current
Nebraska law, it is possible that still further advances, such as contri-
bution among joint tortfeasors'0 2 and more liberal procedures for im-
pleader,103 could draw Nebraska law even closer to the stated "goal"
of basing liability upon the "fault" of the acting parties.
1
°- The Committee on Legislation of the Nebraska State Bar Association has
recommended: "That continued efforts be made to secure legislation dealing
with contributions by joint tort-feasors, with a specification that the contribu-
tion be enforced by a separate action, rather than by a provision enabling
the joint tort-feasor to be made a third-party defendant." Program of the
Fifty-Fourth Annual Meeting of the Nebraska State Bar Ass'n 38-39 (1953).
See Gregory, Legislative Loss Distribution In Negligence Actions c. IX (1936).
"'See Note, When May A Defendant Bring In A Third Party In Nebraska,
32 Neb. L. Rev. 407, 412-413 (1953); Gregory, Legislative Loss Distribution In
Negligence Actions cc. V, X, XII (1936). The most comprehensive comparative
negligence statute is that of Ontario, 3 Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 252 (1950), which is
just slightly more than two pages in length.
